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Note
The Due-on-Sale Clause:
Enforcement Standards
Occidental Savings and Loan Association v. Venco
Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, 293 N.W.2d 843 (1980).
I. INTRODUCTION
Faced with an issue of first impression in Nebraska and a con-
fusing body of law from other states, the Nebraska Supreme Court
recently stopped just short of giving carte blanche approval to the
enforceability of a due-on-sale clause1 in a real estate mortgage.2
With Occidental Savings and Loan Association v. Venco Partner-
ship,3 Nebraska joined a growing majority of states which enforces
mortgage clauses that accelerate the maturity of a note upon the
transfer of the mortgaged property.4
1. A due-on-sale clause (sometimes called a due-on-transfer clause) accelerates
the maturity date of a mortgage upon the transfer of the property underlying
the mortgage. The mortgage note is generally due within 30 days of notice of
transfer. Often the mortgagee will waive his right to accelerate if the mortga-
gor's buyer consents to an increase in the lending rate.
2. Occidental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, 293 N.W.2d
843 (1980).
3. Id.
4. Two general lines of authority have emerged regarding the enforceability of a
due-on-sale clause. Nebraska is now aligned with the first, which favors auto-
matic enforcement without regard to whether the mortgagee's underlying se-
curity has been impaired. Cases following this trend are: First Commercial
Title, Inc. v. Holmes, 92 Nev. 363, 550 P.2d 1271 (1976); Century Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. VanGlahn, 144 N.J. Super. 48, 364 A.2d 558 (1976); Shalit v. In-
vestors Say. & Loan Ass'n, 101 N.J. Super. 283,244 A.2d 151 (1968); Mutual Real
Estate Inv. Trust v. Buffalo Say. Bank, 90 Misc. 2d 675, 395 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup.
Ct. 1977); Stith v. Hudson City Say. Inst., 68 Misc. 2d 863, 313 N.Y.S.2d 804
(Sup. Ct. 1970); Crockett v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224
S.E.2d 580 (1976); Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973); Miller v. Pa-
cific First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 86 Wash. 2d 401, 545 P.2d 546 (1976); Mutual
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 58 Wis. 2d 99,205 N.W.2d 762
(1973), aff'd on rehearing, 71 Wis. 2d 531, 239 N.W.2d 20 (1976).
The other view of enforceability requires the mortgagee to show that his
or her security for the loan will be jeopardized if transfer is allowed. More
than theoretical impairment must be shown, as courts look to the materiality
of the breach. Courts applying this test generally disallow acceleration when
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Although the due-on-sale clause is of relatively recent origin,5 it
already has become a major economic tool enabling savings and
loan associations to balance their loan portfolios. 6 Its use as an
economic weapon cannot be overstated, as market analysts insist
that use of the due-on-sale could mean the difference between con-
tinued loan availability and the eventual loss of long-term mort-
gages altogether. Analysis of the due-on-sale clause sheds light on
its place in the real estate world and highlights the age-old conflict
between property and contract rights. This note addresses the Ne-
braska due-on-sale opinion, studies its possible ramifications, and
draws comparisons to the law in other jurisdictions. It is impor-
tant to note that a simple listing of jurisdictions, classifying their
stance on due-on-sale enforceability is an oversimplification at
best. The issues are complex and thus require careful
examination.
A. Facts
On August 18, 1975, Occidental Savings and Loan Association
(plaintiff/appellee) extended a mortgage to Venco Partnership
(defendant/appellant) on a piece of vacant property in Omaha, Ne-
braska. The terms of the promissory note were principal of $48,000,
the mortgagee's refusal to consent to transfer is based on a purely economic
motive. Cases following this trend include: First S. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Britton, 345 So. 2d 300 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977); Patton v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 118 Ariz. 473, 578 P.2d 152 (1978); Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, 15
Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1971); Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Sav. & Loan, 252 Ark.
849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972); Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943,
148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 582 P.2d 970 (1978); Tucker v. Lassen Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 12
Cal. 3d 629,116 Cal. Rptr. 633, 526 P.2d 1169 (1974); La Sala v. American Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 489 P.2d 1113 (1971); Clark v.
Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Nichols v. Ann Arbor
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163,250 N.W.2d 804 (1977); Continental
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013 (Okla. 1977).
5. Only a few cases dealing with acceleration upon transfer occurred in the
United States prior to 1964, the date of the landmark case of Coast Bank v.
Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505, 392 P.2d 265 (1964) (overruled by
Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943,148 CaL Rptr. 379, 582 P.2d 970
(1978)). Although Coast Bank was overruled, its importance today remains
unquestioned. The policies behind the case, which held that a reasonable
due-on-sale clause was entitled to automatic enforcement, remain persuasive
in several other jurisdictions. See note 4 & accompanying text supra.
6. The due-on-sale clause is often used by the lender as a mechanism for in-
creasing the interest rates on its current loans in order to keep up with in-
creasing market rates. This is done by conditioning consent to transfer upon
the exaction of an increased lending rate or an assumption fee from the trans-
feree. For statistics and further data on the use of the due-on-sale by savings
and loan companies, see UNITED STATEs LEAGUE OF SAvINGs AsSOCIATIONs,
SAVINGS AND LOAN FACT BooK '79 (1979).
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with interest at 9% % per annum payable in monthly installments
of $447.43 over twenty years.
The mortgage contained a clause which conditioned transfer of
the mortgaged property upon the written consent of Occidental.7
Without such consent, the principal balance would be accelerated
and become due within thirty days.e Upon learning of Venco's de-
sire to transfer the property, Occidental offered to waive its right of
acceleration in return for the payment of an assumption fee by
Venco's transferee.9
Venco transferred the property to Midwest Crating and Packing
Services without Occidental's written consent, and Midwest re-
fused to pay the assumption fee. Occidental then exercised its
right of acceleration and instituted an action to foreclose the mort-
gage. Venco and Midwest appealed from a summary judgment in
favor of Occidental, which sustained the validity of the due-on-sale
clause. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed.o
B. Decision
In affirming the trial court's order of foreclosure, the Nebraska
Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Krivosha, said the
due-on-sale clause was entitled to automatic enforcement in Ne-
braska.ll In so holding, the court rejected arguments used in other
jurisdictions to invalidate similar clauses and established that the
enforceability of a due-on-sale clause in Nebraska is governed by
principles of equity.12 Other appellate courts, in determining
when a court's equity powers should be invoked to order relief,
7. The Occidental-Venco clause is reproduced in note 22 infra.
8. The note can be accelerated upon lender's option without notice, at any time
after lender receives notice of a transfer. Acceleration clauses have been
held enforceable in Nebraska upon default of interest, installment, or tax
payments. See note 112 infra. The enforceability of such a clause upon
transfer of property was first tested in Oc-cidental.
9. In its brief, Occidental noted:
It was the custom and policy of Occidental Savings as well as other
savings and loan associations to increase loan mortgage yields to the
then prevailing rate by conditioning waiver of right to acceleration on
payment of an assumption fee and/or an increase in the interest rate
of the mortgage.
Brief of Appellee at 8. The assumption fee demanded was $455.55. Id.
10. 206 Neb. 469, 293 N.W.2d 843 (1980).
11. Id. at 471-73, 293 N.W.2d at 845.
12. Courts which have refused to enforce due-on-sale clauses have done so for
three major reasons. First, courts applying the common law restraint on
alienation test have found that a due-on-sale substantially impairs the bor-
rower's ability to sell his property and thus is void as a restraint on its free
marketability. With regard to this argument, the Occidental court said, "In
our view, the 'due on sale' clause is not a restraint on alienation as that con-
cept is legally defined." 206 Neb. at 471, 293 N.W.2d at 845.
[Vol. 60:594
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have articulated several factors which must be weighed, including
the relative bargaining positions of the parties,' 3 the motivation for
note acceleration,14 and the harshness of enforcement.15 In con-
trast, under the Occidental case, due-on-sale enforceability in Ne-
braska need only be tested by principles of equity and need not be
subjected to further analysis. The court unconditionally excluded
the clause from both restraint-on-alienation 6 and impairment-of-
security analyses.' 7 The level of scrutiny is to be that applied to
other mortgage acceleration clauses.18 Enforcement may be de-
nied only when the court believes injustice or inequity may
result.19
The second justification for denying enforcement has been that a purely
economic motive for accelerating the clause is not proper. These courts re-
quire proof that the lender's security has been impaired. In response, the
Occidental court said, "Balancing portfolio return with cost of money is an
important factor in the survival of lending associations. The 'due on sale'
clause is an important device in maintaining that balance." Id. at 480, 293
N.W.2d at 849.
Third, courts have simply voided the due-on-sale as against public policy.
In striking down this argument, the Nebraska Supreme Court said, "Gener-
ally, a 'due on sale' clause contained in a mortgage contract is not contrary to
the public policy of this jurisdiction and is, therefore, valid and enforceable."
Id. at 481, 293 N.W.2d at 849.
13. The respective bargaining positions of the parties is important, as the due-on-
sale has been labeled a "classic contract of adhesion." Comment, Judicial
Treatment of the Due-on-Sale Clause: The Case for Adopting Standards of
Reasonableness and Unconscionability, 27 STAN. L. RE V. 1109, 1125 (1975). Al-
though surprisingly little case law has developed along these lines, an excel-
lent discussion of the equities involved can be found in La Sala v. American
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 489 P.2d 1113 (1971).
14. Several courts absolutely deny due-on-sale enforcement unless the lender's
security is impaired. See note 4 supra. But other courts allow enforcement
for any motive, so long as inequity does not prevail. The California Supreme
Court said that every contract is subject to an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing and that inquiry was necessary to determine ff the lender
had been reasonable in refusing to consent to a transfer of the mortgage. The
court concluded.
There is no inequity visible from such a provision. Thus, if a note is
executed with a due date of January 31, that is one of its terms, and a
borrower cannot be heard to urge that the inferred provisos of good
faith and fair dealing permit him "reasonably" to pay at a later date.
Cherry v. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 579,81 Cal. Rptr. 135,
138 (1969).
15. A discussion of equity and the consumer can be found in Note, Wellenkamp v.
Bank of America: A Victory for the Consumer? 31 HASTiNGS LIJ. 275 (1979).
16. 206 Neb. at 471, 293 N.W.2d at 845.
17. Id. at 480, 293 N.W.2d at 849.
18. 206 Neb. at 481, 293 N.W.2d at 849. See also note 112 infra.
19. 206 Neb. at 481, 293 N.W.2d at 849.
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II. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
The purpose or motivation for accelerating the mortgage, pursu-
ant to the due-on-sale provision, often determines whether a court
will order enforcement. Although only one case to date has ex-
pressly stated when and under what conditions the provision will
be enforced,20 the lack of a stated purpose has caused courts to
strike the due-on-sale from a mortgage.21 Typical due-on-sale lan-
guage is contained in the Occidental-Venco mortgage.22
While the Occidental mortgage failed to specify purposes for or
conditions precedent to acceleration, its obvious effect was either
to prevent transfer of the property entirely or at least to condition
its transfer. A due-on-sale mortgagee often conditions consent to a
transfer upon an agreement to increase the lending rate or the
payment of an assumption fee.23 Additionally, consent to transfer
may be conditioned upon assumption by a financially suitable
transferee. The central issue in most due-on-sale cases has been
whether the lender can accelerate the mortgage for purposes of
pure economic gain, or whether the right of acceleration should be
limited to situations where there is doubt as to the financial stabil-
ity of the mortgagor's transferee.24
Although no case to date has invalidated the due-on-sale in the
abstract, three major limitations on its enforcement have evolved.
Courts have invalidated the acceleration clause when: (1) it was
found to be either a direct or an indirect restraint on alienation;25
20. See Miller v. Pacific Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 86 Wash. 2d 401, 545 P.2d 546
(1976). The absence of a stated motive for acceleration has carried significant
weight in several opinions. In Lane v. Bisceglia, 15 Ariz. App. 269, 272, 488
P.2d 474,476 (1971), the court refused to enforce a due-on-sale upon which the
lender conditioned approval of assumption on an increase in the interest rate.
The court held enforcement inequitable in the absence of a provision in the
contract so conditioning transfer.
21. See Continental Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013 (Okla. 1977).
22. The due-on-sale clause provides as follows:
In the event of a sale of said premises without the written ap-
proval of said association, then the whole indebtedness hereby se-
cured, shall, at the option of said association, immediately become
due and collectible without further notice and this mortgage may
then be foreclosed to recover the amount due on said note or
obligation.
Brief of Appellee at 14, Occidental Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership,
206 Neb. 649, 293 N.W.2d 843 (1980).
23. See note 6 & accompanying text supra.
24. Compare ABA Committee on Real Estate Financing, Enforcement of Due-On.
Transfer Clauses, 13 REAL PROP., PROB. & Tn. J. 891 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as ABA Committee], with Comment, Mortgages-A Catalogue and Critique
on the Role of Equity in the Enforcement of Modern-Day "Due-on-Sale"
Clauses, 26 ARK. L REV. 485 (1973), and Note, supra note 15.
25. Cases which have held the due-on-sale to be a restraint on alienation include:
[Vol. 60:594
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(2) the security of the mortgagee would not be impaired by the
transfer;26 or (3) the court deemed the clause inequitable or un-
conscionable under the circumstances. 27
A. Restraint on Alienation
The notion of a restraint on alienation comes from the common
law principle that all property should be freely transferable.28 Any
restriction on this fundamental property right is void as against
public policy. 29 It is unclear why many courts have, without expla-
nation, voided the due-on-sale as a restraint on alienation. The
clause does not directly prohibit the transfer of property; a mortga-
gor can always extinguish the debt upon transfer, and thus avoid
the necessity of obtaining written consent or assenting to an as-
sumption fee.30
Courts frequently cite the Restatement of Property3l as author-
Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943,148 Cal. Rptr. 379,582 P.2d 970
(1978); Clark v. Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Nichols
v. Ann Arbor Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163, 250 N.W.2d 804 (1977).
26. The California Supreme Court said, "When such enforcement is not reason-
ably necessary to protect the security, the lender's use of the clause to exact
collateral benefits must be held an unlawful restraint on alienation." La Sala
v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 882, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849,861, 489 P.2d
1113,1125 (1971). Accord, Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 II 2d 119,
333 N.E.2d 1 (1975); Bellingham First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrison, 87
Wash. 2d 437, 553 P.2d 1090 (1976).
27. Several courts test due-on-sale enforcement by its reasonableness: "It fol-
lows that the invocation of the clause must be based on grounds that are rea-
sonable on their face." Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, 15 Ariz. App. 78,81,486
P.2d 190, 193 (1971). Accord, Malouff v. Midland Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 181
Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240 (1973); Mutual Real Estate Inv. Trust v. Buffalo Sav.
Bank, 90 Misc. 2d 675, 395 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1977).
28. An excellent discussion of the common law principle concerning restraint on
alienation can be found in Volkmer, The Application of the Restraints on
Alienation Doctrine to Real Property Security Interests, 58 IowA L REv. 747
(1973).
29. Id.
30. One commentator noted-
Obviously, the due-on clause does not prohibit transfer, and cannot
be enforced to prevent the transfer. The clause first requires consent
to transfer, but the borrower is able to avoid obtaining that consent
by paying the debt. Any forfeiture or loss of the property can be
avoided by 'redemption," the payment of the debt then due.
ABA Committee, supra note 24, at 898.
31. The RESTATEMENT provides that-
A restraint on alienation, as that phrase is used in this Restatement,
is an attempt by an otherwise effective conveyance or contract to
cause a later conveyance
(a) to be void, or(b) to impose contractual liability on the one who makes the
later conveyance when such liability results from a breach
of an agreement not to convey; or
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ity for striking down the due-on-sale as a restraint on alienation.
But the analysis generally stops with the citation and leaves unan-
swered the question of how the due-on-sale fits within its prohibi-
tion on restraints. A Michigan appellate court decision, Nichols v.
Ann Arbor Federal Savings and Loan Association,3 2 is illustrative
of this cursory approach. The Nichols court concluded: "If the
mortgage clause defendant seeks to enforce can be labeled as a
restraint on alienation only by expanding the restatement defini-
tion, we do not hesitate to stretch the term to include this 'due-on-
sale' clause."33 Such a justification for finding the due-on-sale to
be a restraint led the Occidental court to state: '"The oft-repeated
assumption that a 'due-on-sale' clause restrains the alienation of
property is without satisfactory proof."34 The Nebraska court held
as a matter of law that the clause was neither a direct nor indirect
restraint on alienation within the meaning of the common law
principle.35 While no court has stated that a due-on-sale is a direct
restraint on alienation, many have denied its enforcement on the
grounds that it indirectly restrains the transferability of prop-
erty.36 The notion of an indirect restraint is that the clause is a
restraint in its practical effect. Due-on-sale critics suggest the
clause fits this category even though the transfer of property is not
absolutely prohibited.37 They suggest that the total liquidation of
(c) to terminate or subject to termination all or a part of the
property interest conveyed.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 404 (1944).
[A] restraint on the alienation of a legal possessory estate in fee sim-
ple which is, or but for the restraint would be, indefeasible is valid if,
and only if,
(a) the restraint is a promissory restraint or a forfeiture re-
straint, and
(b) the restraint is qualified so as to permit alienation to some
though not all possible alienees, and
(c) the restraint is reasonable under the circumstances, and
(d) if the restraint is a forfeiture restraint, the requirements of
the rule against perpetuities are satisfied.
Id. § 406.
32. 73 Mich. App. 163, 250 N.W.2d 804 (1977).
33. Id. at 166-67, 250 N.W.2d at 806 (emphasis added).
34. 206 Neb. at 478, 293 N.W.2d at 848.
35. Id. at 479, 293 N.W.2d at 848.
36. One common test for an indirect restraint is as follows:
To uphold restraints on the alienation of such estates it must appear
that the objective sought to be accomplished by the imposition of the
restraint is of sufficient social importance to outweigh the evils which
flow from interfering with the power of alienation or that the curtail-
ment of the power of alienation is so slight that no social danger is
involved.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 406, Comment a (1944).
37. One author has suggested that judicial reasoning which enforces the due-on-
sale ignores the realities of the residential real estate market. Comment,
[Vol. 60:594
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the debt and subsequent transfer is not a viable alternative be-
cause few people could afford to pay off their mortgage in a lump
sum.38 Thus, given the current money situation, a mortgagee's re-
fusal to consent to a transfer is a practical restraint on the salabil-
ity of property.3 9
In Wellenkamp v. Bank of America,40 the California Supreme
Court, overruling its earlier position on due-on-sale clauses, aban-
doned all notions of automatic enforcement and laid down a new
and stringent test for enforceability.41 The court held that a due-
on-sale contained in a mortgage or deed of trust cannot be en-
forced unless the lender can demonstrate that enforcement is rea-
sonably necessary to protect against impairment of his security or
the risk of default.42 The Wellenkamp court struck down a clause
which conditioned consent for transfer upon an increase in the in-
terest rate even though the transferee was financially suitable and
the risk of default was not increased.43 The court reasoned that
the due-on-sale in this situation was unreasonably burdensome to
the consumer-mortgagor in tight money market situations.44 The
supra note 13, at 1113. The author argued. "Exercise of the mortgagee's op-
tion to demand payment of the outstanding debt may interfere with the mort-
gagor's right to sell as effectively as issuance of an injunction directly barring
the sale." Id.
38. See id.
39. Id.
40. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 582 P.2d 970 (1978).
41. Wellenkamp overruled Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 38 Cal. Rptr.
505, 392 P.2d 265 (1964) and Cherry v. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App.
2d 574, 81 CaL Rptr. 135 (1969), insofar as those opinions allowed for auto-
matic enforcement of the due-on-sale. Cherry and Coast Bank held the due-
on-sale clause to be per se valid unless unreasonable.
42. 21 Cal. 3d at 953, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86, 582 P.2d at 976-77.
43. Id.
44. The Wellenkamp court explained the positions in which a due-on-sale placed
the parties to the contract:
The availability of new financing often depends upon general eco-
nomic conditions. In times of inflation, when money is "tight" and
funds available for real estate loans are in short supply, new financ-
ing may be difficult, if not impossible to obtain. The same result may
occur when interest rates and the transactional costs of obtaining
new financing are high, making it economically unfeasible for the
buyer to acquire a new loan. When economic conditions are such
that new financing is either unavailable or economically unfeasible,
the seller and buyer will normally agree to a form of financing ar-
rangement wherein the buyer will assume the seller's loan. In such
circumstances, if the lender is unwilling to permit assumption of the
existing loan, and instead elects to enforce the due-on clause, trans-
fer of the property may be prohibited entirely, because the buyer will
be unable to substitute a new loan for the loan being called due, and
the seller will not receive an amount from the buyer sufficient to dis-
charge that loan, particularly when the balance due is substan-
tial.... [T] he result in terms of a restraint on alienation is clear.
19811
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effect of the clause, according to the California court, was to elimi-
nate the possibility and opportunity for transfer of property.45 In
essence, the Wellenkamp court based its holding on the presumed
restraining effect upon possible borrowers under theoretical eco-
nomic conditions.4 6 In a strong dissent, Justice Clark said: "In at-
tempting to take away contractual rights of lenders in order to
assist borrowers in selling encumbered properties, the majority
opinion has devised a scheme which affords yesterday's borrower
a clear advantage over today's seller who comes to the market-
place with his property free from encumbrance."4 7
Clark explained his position by emphasizing that in tight
money markets financing is often unavailable, so if the due-on-sale
is not enforced, the mortgagor-buyer would receive financing not
otherwise available.46 As an added bonus, the mortgagor would
receive financing at a lower-than-market rate.49 Clark added,
"[t] he loan has thus become not a restraint on alienation but a fac-
tor making salable what before could not be sold."50
Applying this rationale, the Occidental court theorized that
"[t] he effect of a rising interest market [combined with an] invalid
'due-on-sale' clause would be to permit a seller to obtain a pre-
mium for the sale of its property at the expense of the lender."5 1
The court said neither law nor equity should permit such a
result.5 2
Courts which have adopted the Wellenkamp position first as-
sume that the clause is a restraint on alienation and then condition
its enforcement on proof of reasonableness. 53 A lender must es-
21 Cal. 3d at 950-51, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383-84, 582 P.2d at 974-75 (footnotes
omitted).
45. Id.
46. A critic of Wellenkamp noted:
It does not appear that any other due-on decision has based its con-
clusion on similar economic theory, or even contemplated the possi-
bility that a transfer by outright sale may enhance the lender's
position. It is observed that both subjects are treated in speculative
and nonfactual terms. Theoretical justifications offered by a lender
that transfer is inherently a threat to security is thus met by equally
theoretical response.
ABA Committee, supra note 24, at 915.
47. 21 Cal. 3d at 954, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 386, 582 P.2d at 977.
48. 21 Cal. 3d at 957, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 388, 582 P.2d at 979.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 206 Neb. at 479, 293 N.W.2d at 848.
52. Id.
53. Proof of reasonableness was required in the following cases: Patton v. First
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 118 Ariz. 473, 578 P.2d 152 (1978); Tucker v. Lassen
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633, 526 P.2d 1169 (1974); La
Sala v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 489 P.2d
[Vol. 60:594
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tablish that acceleration of the principal is not only reasonable
under the circumstances, but also necessary to serve a legitimate
interest.54 Most courts applying this test refuse enforcement when
the motive for accelerating the mortgage is increasing the lending
rate.55
Fashioning a test of reasonableness, the California Supreme
Court in Tucker v. Lassen Savings and Loan Association56 stated
that a due-on-sale was enforceable only when the lender could
prove that its motivation for acceleration was either to preserve
the security from waste or depreciation or to assure that the mort-
gagor's buyer was at least as good a credit risk as was the mortga-
gor.57 A critic of this approach suggests it "causes a court to
consider along sharply defined lines whether certain conduct is or
is not reasonable, and avoids looking to the circumstances of the
conduct."58
The Occidental court joined the critics of this reasonableness
approach, noting the burden which a case-by-case determination
1113 (1971); Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163,
250 N.W.2d 804 (1977); Bellingham First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrison, 87
Wash. 2d 437, 553 P.2d 1090 (1976).
54. A legitimate interest was defined by the California Supreme Court as follows:
Such legitimate interests include not only that of preserving the se-
curity from waste or depreciation but also that of guarding against
what has been termed the '"moral risks" of having to resort to the
security upon default. ... Thus, for example, if the beneficiary can
show that the party in possession ... is, or is likely to be, conducting
himself with respect to the property in a manner which will probably
result in a significant wasting or other impairment of the security, he
may properly insist upon enforcement of the "due-on" clause. Simi-
larly, if the beneficiary can show that the prospects of default.., are
significantly enhanced in the particular situation, such circum-
stances might constitute a sufficient justification for enforcement of
the clause despite its restraining effect. Other legitimate interests of
the lender may have a similar effect.
Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 639,116 Cal. Rptr. 633, 639,
526 P.2d 1169, 1175 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
55. See, e.g., La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 880 n.17, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 849,859 n.17, 489 P.2d 1113, 1123 n.17 (1971) ("In any event, a restraint on
alienation cannot be found reasonable merely because it is commercially
beneficial to the restrainor. Otherwise one could justify any restraint on
alienation upon the ground that the lender could exact a valuable considera-
tion in return for its waiver .... ").
56. 12 Cal. 3d 629, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633, 526 P.2d 1169 (1974).
57. Id. at 639, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639, 526 P.2d at 1175.
58. Bernhard, The Minority Doctrine Concerning Direct Restraints on Alienation,
57 Mc. L REv. 1173 (1959). Bernhard suggested a more flexible approach
with regard to restraints: A restraint that is reasonable under the circum-
stances should be valid. Reasonableness is tested by whether the purpose
behind the restraint outweighs its effect in terms of the actual hindering of
alienability of the property in question. I& at 1177.
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of reasonableness would place on the court system.5 9 It also ar-
gued that calling upon the courts to be periodic arbitrators would
unduly burden the real estate world.0 Case-by-case analysis
would lend uncertainty to real estate titles in a field where cer-
tainty is vital. Without some framework in which to deal, both
buyer and seller can never know, absent litigation, whether the
due-on-sale will be enforced.61
The court, in Occidental, noted the possibility of courts apply-
ing this reasonableness test to other solutions to varying market
problems.6 2 The court said financing could be eliminated alto-
gether if any market hindrance imposed by the lender could be
held invalid.63 If the due-on-sale were to be eliminated, the court
reasoned, all other inflation-fighting solutions, such as the short-
term rollover and variable interest mortgage,6 4 would also fail.65 In
essence, invalidation of the due-on-sale clause could begin a dom-
59. 206 Neb. at 477-78, 293 N.W.2d at 847-48.
60. Id.
61. Id. Another court rejecting a case-by-case approach said, "Since stability of
real estate titles is of paramount importance it is necessary that the court
follow a policy in construing restraints on alienation which will produce a
reasonable degree of certainty." Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 11.
2d 119, 126, 333 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1975). Baker held that the due-on-sale was unen-
forceable without a showing of impairment of security.
62. 206 Neb. at 477, 293 N.W.2d at 847.
63. Noting the possible effect of invalidating the due-on-sale clause, the Occiden-
tal court said:
If any market hindrance imposed by the lender can be held to be a
practical restraint on alienation and, therefore, invalid, no solution to
varying market conditions can ever be validated and, ultimately, no
one will be able to secure satisfactory financing.
If we conclude that a "due-on-sale" clause is an unreasonable re-
straint on alienation and is, therefore, void, it may follow that mort-
.ages of short duration (less than 3 or 4 years) with variable rates are
ewise invalid as indirect restraints on alienation. Certainly,
whatever arguments are made about the inability to convey property
because of a "due-on-sale" clause, may also be made with regard to a
mortgage that must be renegotiated within 2 or 3 years after the sale
at a price which the subsequent buyer may not be able to determine.
Id. at 477, 293 N.W.2d at 847-48.
64. Examples of such inflation-related devices are:
1. Variable Rate Mortgage (VRM). The interest rate on a VRM var-
ies with some referenced index that reflects changes in market rates
of interest. Although future monthly payments are not known at the
time the loan is originated, restrictions on the VRM rate and other
safeguards can limit the uncertainty involved.... 4. Roll-over
Mortgage (ROM). The ROM (currently used in Canada) is in effect
a short-term loan with a long-term amortization period, with periodi-
cally renegotiated interest rates, and payments according to then
current market conditions. 5. Price Level Adjusted Mortgage
(PLAM). The interest rate on a PLAM is fixed, but the actual princi-
pal amount due and the monthly payments are adjusted according to
some price index.
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ino effect which would negate solution after solution until both
lender and borrower were placed at the mercy of the market.66
Thus, the court concluded that the due-on-sale clause is not a re-
straint on alienation within the meaning of the common law
doctrine.67
B. Impairment of Security
As previously noted, courts looking to the reasonableness of the
clause often condition its enforcement upon a proper motive. And
such a motive has almost always been interpreted as protection
from the impairment of security.68 Some courts, which have de-
nied that the due-on-sale is a restraint on alienation and have
looked to the equity of enforcement, have also placed great weight
on whether the lender's motive for acceleration is security ori-
ented.69 In Baltimore Life Insurance v. Ha77,70 an Arizona appel-
late court said:
Absent an allegation that the purpose of the clause is in some respect
being circumvented or that the mortgagee's security is jeopardized, a
plaintiff cannot be entitled to equitable relief. Otherwise the equitable
powers of the trial court would be invoked to impose an extreme penalty
on a mortgagor with no showing that he has violated the substance of the
agreement, that is, that he would not make a conveyance that would im-
pair the security.71
Once again, the lender's motive for acceleration was a determi-
Cowan & Foley, New Trends in Residential Mortgage Finance, 13 REAL PROP.,
PROB. & T. J. 1075, 1078 (1978).
65. 206 Neb. at 477, 293 N.W.2d at 847-48.
66. Id.
67. The Occidental court admitted that a possibility of acceleration impedes the
ability of the owner to sell his property as he wishes, but stated that not every
impediment to sale should be construed as a restraint on alienation or as
repugnant to public policy. The court noted, "It is a fact that zoning restric-
tions, building restrictions, or public improvements may impede the sale and
substantially affect the ability of an owner to realize a maximum price." Id.
at 473, 293 N.W.2d at 845. The court asserted that no one would suggest that
these restraints (zoning, etc.) should be struck down as a restraint or voided
for policy reasons. Id.
68. ABA Committee, supra note 24, at 898-900.
69. See, e.g., Bellingham First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrison, 87 Wash. 2d 437,
553 P.2d 1090 (1976); Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. American Medical
Serv., 66 Wis. 2d 210, 223 N.W.2d 921 (1974); Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Wisconsin Wire Works, 58 Wis. 2d 99, 205 N.W.2d 762 (1973), aff'd on rehear-
ing, 71 Wis. 2d 531, 239 N.W.2d 20 (1976).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court said that impairment of security was not a
condition precedent to enforcement, but that "an absence of impairment of
security is a factor that a trial court may put on the scales in weighing the
equities involved." 66 Wis. 2d at 217, 223 N.W.2d at 925.
70. 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1971).
71. Id. at 81, 486 P.2d at 193.
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native factor in the court's decision whether or not to enforce the
due-on-sale. It is not clear from Baltimore or subsequent court
opinions applying its test whether the clause would be enforced if
the express terms of the contract provided for the exaction of
added interest upon transfer. However, nothing in these opinions
would seem to be contradicted if acceleration were based on an
expressly bargained-for element of the contract.
In a dissenting opinion of a North Carolina case which held a
due-on-sale enforceable regardless of motive, Justice Lake warned
that any attempt to use the clause to exact additional interest
could result in a "loan shark's trap for the unwary borrower."72
Justice Lake labeled the due-on-sale a "sleeper" provision7 3 tucked
away in a mortgage or deed of trust, ready to be pulled out when
the market conditions warranted. He said that a lender's ability to
use the clause solely for economic gain would not catch the atten-
tion of the average mortgagor or subsequent purchaser.74 He as-
serted that if the purpose of the clause is to increase interest rates
when the market requires such a purpose should be expressly
stated in the contract.75 Contrary to Justice Lake's opinion, due-
on-sale clauses are no longer the sleeper clauses they once were,
as their placement in modern mortgages is routine. To say that
they are beyond the contemplation of the general public is naive at
best.
In this same vein, the Illinois Supreme Court in Baker v. Loves
Park Savings and Loan Association7 6 determined the purpose of
the due-on-sale was to protect the lenders' security and thus condi-
tioned enforcement on proof of its impairment. 7 Applying the
72. Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 634, 224 S.E.2d 580, 589
(1976) (Lake, J. dissenting).
73. Id.
74. Justice Lake explained how the due-on-sale could trap an unwary borrower,
as follows:
In the present instance, the accelerating event, as now construed by
the money lender, is a "sleeper" provision, tucked away in the
printed portion of the deed of trust so that its meaning, as now as-
serted by the money lender, would not readily catch the attention of
a mortgagor, or a subsequent purchaser of the property, reading the
deed of trust. A moderately alert and wary reader could easily as-
sure the provision contemplated that the mortgagee's assent to a
subsequent conveyance would not be unreasonably withheld and
that the provision was intended only to protect the mortgagee's
security.
Id. at 633, 224 S.E.2d at 589.
75. Id. at 634, 224 S.E.2d at 589.
76. 61 IlL. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1 (1975).
77. Illinois courts assume that the due-on-sale clause is a restraint on alienation.
In Baker, the court upheld the clause because it was a reasonable restraint-
"It is a restraint imposed for the purpose of protecting the security interest of
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same test, the Washington Supreme Court7 8 held that the lender
had met its burden of proof by showing that the mortgagor's pro-
spective transferee had a bad overall credit rating, including delin-
quency on six outstanding mortgages.7 9
Short of such an obvious risk of default, courts have failed to
definitively state when the lender's security is impaired to the ex-
tent of allowing acceleration.8 0 However, courts have been quick
to place the burden of proof of impairment on the lender.81
Courts which refuse to view the enforceability of the due-on-
sale in terms of its restraining effect or its purpose of protecting
lenders' security generally allow automatic enforcement.82 The ra-
tionale rests generally on either economic necessity or the sanctity
of the contract. Occidental's proclamation for automatic enforce-
ment rests on both.83
1. Economic motive
Courts which have upheld the due-on-sale solely for the pur-
pose of allowing lenders to maintain interest portfolios at current
lending rates 84 have generally justified such a result on the
grounds of protecting lenders from the varying economic condi-
tions of the money market and of protecting borrowers from the
the lender, a recognized valid purpose for which a restraint may be imposed."
Id. at 125, 333 N.E.2d at 4.
78. Beluingham First Fed. Say. & Loan v. Garrison, 87 Wash. 2d 437, 553 P.2d 1090
(1976).
79. Id. at 441, 553 P.2d at 1092.
80. ABA Committee, supra note 24.
81. The following cases held that the due-on-sale was not enforceable unless and
until the lender could prove his failure to consent to transfer was based on a
greater risk of default by the mortgagor's transferee: Baltimore Life Ins. Co.
v. Ham, 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1971); Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972); Beluingham First Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. Garrison, 87 Wash. 2d 437, 553 P.2d 1090 (1976).
82. See note 4 & accompanying text supra.
83. 206 Neb. at 480-81, 293 N.W.2d at 849.
84. Twenty of the 23 due-on-sale cases have concerned the propriety of accelerat-
ing the mortgage for a strictly economic purpose. Four cases concern prepay-
ment or assumption fees, and 16 concern interest-rate adjustments. The nine
cases which specifically allow the lender to increase the interest rate are:
Cherry v. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135
(1969); Malouff v. Midland Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240
(1973); Century Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. VanGlahn, 144 N.J. Super. 48, 364
A.2d 558 (1976); Stith v. Hudson City Sav. Inst., 63 Misc. 2d 863, 313 N.Y.S.2d
804 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Crockett v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224
S.E.2d 580 (1976); People's Sav. Ass'n v. Standard Indus., Inc., 22 Ohio App. 2d
35,257 N.E.2d 406 (1970); Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973); Miller
v. Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 86 Wash. 2d 401, 545 P.2d 546 (1976);
Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 58 Wis. 2d 99, 205
N.W.2d 762 (1973), aff'd on rehearing, 71 Wis. 2d 531, 239 N.W.2d 20 (1976).
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possibility of not being able to obtain financing.8 5 Proponents of
the due-on-sale suggest it is necessary to assure that savings and
loan associations will continue to be able to finance the American
housing market.86 As one commentator stated: "Elimination of
the due-on-sale clause may potentially work as great an economic
hardship on mortgage lending institutions as complete license in
the enforcement of such devices may work on mortgagors attempt-
ing to sell their property."87
The assets of savings and loan companies consist primarily of
long-term home mortgages. Funds necessary to make new loans
and to maintain liquidity on existing mortgage portfolios are raised
primarily by short-term and demand savings accounts and certifi-
85. The ABA Committee on Real Estate Financing noted that only recently have
federal or state regulations allowed for interest adjustment during the life of
a long-term loan. ABA Committee, supra note 24. The use of variable rate,
roll-over, and price-level-adjusted mortgages, capable of responding to eco-
nomic pressures, have only recently developed. See note 64 & accompanying
text supra. In support of the due-on-sale clause, the ABA noted that the
clause currently represented "the principal, and likely only, means by which
a lender could attempt to increase the interest rate during the amortization
period." ABA Committee, supra note 24, at 897.
86. In an amicus curiae brief in support of due-on-sale enforcement, the Ne-
braska League of Savings Associations said the due-on-sale clause was a crit-
ical and necessary device in order to preserve savings and loan associations
in Nebraska. The League noted that the savings industry is faced with a rap-
idly increasing cost of funds and at the same time is saddled with long-term
mortgages which yield much less than current interest rates.
This differential is not a trifling matter. The appellants imply that
savings and loans are seeking windfall profits in their attempt to
keep mortgage portfolio yields reasonably current. In fact, charging
current prices for money which the savings and loan must pay cur-
rent rates to obtain is merely avoiding losses, not reaping profits.
These losses can only be sustained so long as there is net worth to
absorb them. The average nationwide net worth of savings and loan
associations was 5.5% of assets in 1978. A differential of only 1% in
portfolio yield and cost of funds would completely deplete this net
worth in five years. But the institutions would go out of business
much sooner than that as liquidity was impaired or net worth failed
to meet regulatory requirements.
These figures are, of course, averages and are variable. Enforce-
ment of due-on-sale clauses will not keep mortgage yields completely
current. The annual turnover ratio of mortgage loans has varied from
approximately 12% to 18% since 1971. This means that the average
mortgage life has varied from 8% to 5% years. But the difference
between five or eight years on the one hand and 25 or 30 years on the
other is apparent. Balancing portfolio return with cost of money is
the single most importantfactor in the survival of a mortgage lending
institution. Enforcement of due-on-sale clauses is an indispensable
tool to help reach that goal.
Brief of Amicus Curiae, Nebraska League of Savings Associations, at 7-8, Oc-
cidental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, 293 N.W.2d 843
(1980) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
87. Volkmer, supra note 28, at 799.
[Vol. 60:594
DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSE
cates.88 Savings and loan associations ordinarily invest eighty per-
cent of their assets in long-term mortgages at fixed rates of
interest, while their liabilities consist of highly liquid short-term
deposits. Lenders must maintain sufficient income to pay the in-
terest on their deposits and negotiate new loans. As interest rates
rise, so must the lender's income. When the lender carries old
loans with lower interest rates, a corresponding increase on new
loans must be made to balance. This disparity causes a magnify-
ing effect, forcing new buyers to partially subsidize old borrowers.
Thus, if an old loan can be renegotiated to current lending rates,
new borrowers will receive loans at lower rates.89
The savings and loan industry is particularly harmed in times
of inflation because depositors withdraw their funds in favor of
more advantageous investment possibilities.90 Savings and loan
associations are prevented from raising interest yields on deposits
because of a federal ceiling.91 This squeeze on lenders is bound to
have an adverse effect on the housing market, including:
(1) higher rates to new borrowers; (2) a shrinkage in funds avail-
able for financing; and (3) a possible end to long-term mortgages.92
Recently, in response to the Wellenkamp decision, the Bank of
America in California announced that it no longer would issue
long-term mortgages. 93
The severity of today's economic situation is demonstrated best
by a 1979 congressional bill which pre-empted state law and elimi-
nated all usury ceilings on home mortgage loans through March 31,
1980.94 Lenders need some relief. Possibly, as the availability and
use of alternative mortgage devices increase, 95 the need for the
due-on-sale clause to increase the interest rate during the amorti-
zation period will not be so acute. But until such devices are made
readily available through legislative action, the courts will con-
tinue to struggle with balancing the equities between lenders and
borrowers.
Due-on-sale advocates have at least intimated that if the due-
on-sale is not enforceable, the consumer might win today, but lose
88. Brief of Amicus Curiae, Nebraska League of Savings Associations, at 4, Occi-
dental Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, 293 N.W.2d 843
(1980).
89. See Note, Due-On Clauses: Restraints on Alienation And the Legitimacy of
Portfolio Maintenance, 14 WULAMETrE L.J. 295 (1978).
90. Cowan & Foley, supra note 64, at 1081.
91. 12 C.F.R § 526.2 (1980).
92. Cowan & Foley, supra note 64, at 1093.
93. Van Wallach, The Demise of Due-On-Sale?, FORBES, Jan. 19, 1981, at 51.
94. Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L No. 96-161, § 105 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730a,
1735f-5, 1735f-7, 1752 (Supp. 1I 1979)).
95. See note 64 & accompanying text supra.
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tomorrow. 96 If today's savings and loan associations are forced to
absorb the brunt of today's rising interest market, they will be
forced to make up those losses by charging higher interest rates to
tomorrow's borrowers. The more practical policy would favor en-
forcement of the due-on-sale today to minimize the effects of the
market on future mortgagors. The equities balance in favor of
lenders, especially when the borrower is not subject to a prepay-
ment penalty.97
A due-on-sale was lauded in Crockett v. First Federal Savings
and Loan of Charlotte98 as the best way to balance the ability of
both lender and borrower to take advantage of or minimize dam-
ages from fluctuations in interest rates.99 The North Carolina court
noted that the borrower has the best of both worlds in that he or
she has: (1) the security of being able to pay off the long-term
mortgage at the original low interest rate upon maturity; or (2) the
ability to pay the loan off early in order to take advantage of mar-
ket-rate declines by refinancing at the lower rate. The lender is
protected, according to the court, because it can increase the rate
in proportion to the market rate upon transfer.100 As noted earlier,
the Wellenkamp dissentlO' argued that precluding enforcement of
the due-on-sale clause for economic reasons made alienable what
otherwise would not have been alienable because of tight financ-
ing. In this situation, a borrower is in essence selling a low interest
rate along with the property,10 2 and he or she obtains a market
advantage at the expense of lending institutions.
96. Note Justice Clark's dissenting opinion in Wellenkamp, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 956-57,
148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 387-88, 582 P.2d 970, 978-79, which speculates as to the long-
term effects of invalidation of the due-on-sale clause.
97. This was true in the Occidental mortgage, which contained the following
clause: 'This obligation may be paid in full at any time before maturity, with-
out notice, provided interest is paid to the end of the calendar month in which
such payment is made." Brief of Appellee at 15, Occidental Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, 293 N.W.2d 843 (1980).
98. 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976).
99. I at 626, 224 S.E.2d at 585.
100. The court concluded that the borrower, not the lender, would hold the upper
hand if the clause were enforced, as he or she would not even have to wait for
alienation of the property to take advantage of changed interest rates. If the
due-on-sale were not enforced, an even more superior position for the bor-
rower would result because a bargained-for element of the contract would be
excluded, and thus not available to the lender. Id. at 626, 224 S.E.2d at 585.
101. 21 Cal. 3d at 957, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 388, 582 P.2d at 979.
102. Because loans are not readily available in tight money markets, a borrower
with an unenforceable due-on-sale clause can offer a loan to a transferee that
might not otherwise be available. In addition to being able to offer the loan,
the borrower/mortgagee can offer that loan at his original interest rate (gen-
erally lower than the current market rate). For this reason, borrower/mort-
gagee has a highly salable piece of property. For further discussion, see ABA
Committee, supra note 24, at 925-28.
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The New Jersey Superior Court103 stated that savings and loan
associations are obliged to include the due-on-sale clause in all
mortgage loans because of their fiduciary duty to obtain the best
lawful yield on their mortgage portfolios.104 In Occidental, the
court stated: '"The potential failure of savings and loan associa-
tions and the loss of their depositors' funds should be of no less a
concern to the courts than the inability of a property owner to
transfer its mortgage at a premium when selling its property."105
The court explained that balancing interest portfolios is essential
to the survival of savings and loan associations in Nebraska, and
the due-on-sale is an important device in maintaining that
balance.106
2. Sanctity of contract
Several courts, in attempts to assign the risk of varying market
conditions to either borrowers or lenders, examine the contract's
express provisions. 0 7 In Crockett v. First Federal Savings and
Loan Association of Charlotte,08 the majority opinion emphatical-
ly stated: "It is the simple law of contracts that 'as a man consents
to bind himself, so shall he be bound.' "109 While most courts take
a more flexible approach, the consensus is that the mortgagee's
contract rights are no less important than the mortgagor's." 0
In Occidental, the court compared the due-on-sale clause to any
other acceleration clause contained in a mortgage and declared it
to be subject to the same rules of enforcement."' Generally, Ne-
103. Century Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. VanGlahn, 144 N.J. Super. 48, 364 A.2d 558
(1976).
104. The court held, "Calling a loan in order to get the full benefit of current inter-
est rates is a legitimate and reasonable business practice-one which pro-
tects the Association member.., as well as fulfilling the statutory purpose of
the association." 144 N.J. Super. at 54, 364 A.2d at 561.
105. 206 Neb. at 480, 293 N.W.2d at 849.
106. Id.
107. The issue in these cases is whether or not there has been a breach of an
agreement not to sell the property without the consent of the mortgagee. If
such breach is found, the mortgagee is allowed to accelerate. Courts adher-
ing to this view include: First Commercial Title, Inc. v. Holmes, 92 Nev. 363,
550 P.2d 1271 (1976); Century Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. VanGlahn, 144 N.J.
Super. 48, 364 A.2d 558 (1976); Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973).
108. 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976).
109. Id. at 630, 224 S.E.2d at 587 (citing Troitino v. Goodman, 225 N.C. 406, 414, 35
S.E.2d 277, 283 (1945)).
110. Century Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. VanGlahn, 144 N.J. Super. at 55,364 A.2d at
562.
111. The Occidental court noted that it found nothing so extraordinary about the
due-on-sale clause that should remove it from the scrutiny test applied to all
other acceleration clauses. Generally, a stipulation in a mortgage calling the
loan upon default of principal, interest, or another contract condition is per-
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braska courts have not viewed acceleration clauses with disfavor;
they have construed them according to the intent of the parties
and have subjected them to other rules applicable to contracts." 2
Hence, Occidental refused to strike down the due-on-sale as a con-
tract clause repugnant to public policy. The Nebraska court said
the use of the clause to exact a greater interest rate, and thus to
encourage the balancing of interest portfolios, was an eminently
proper motive for enforcement."13
In response to the lender's demand for an increased interest
rate upon transfer, the court in Gunther v. White 114 said that "eq-
uity should not depart from the law which requires it to enforce
valid contracts .... 115 Gunther further established that the
clause should not be struck down merely because the lender, and
not the borrower, would profit from the increased cost of money." 6
Generally, commentators have viewed financing as a contract
rather than a property right, with the responsibility on the parties
to bargain for the uncertainties of the market." 7 Occidental made
it clear that courts should not remake contracts unless the preser-
vation of the public welfare so demands." 8 The Nebraska court
emphasized its strong adherence to the policy of allowing parties
to freely contract within the parameters of the law and public pol-
icy.119 Applying Nebraska case law, the court stated: "We are
cited to no authority, nor are we able to find any, which would le-
gally justify declaring a contract provision such as the one in the
instant case, generally referred to as a 'due on sale' clause, to be
fectly legal and enforceable and is not in the nature of a penalty or forfeiture
which a court of equity will refuse to enforce. 206 Neb. at 480-81, 293 N.W.2d at
849.
112. Nebraska cases upholding acceleration clauses include: United Benefit Life
Ins. Co. v. Holman, 177 Neb. 682, 130 N.W.2d 593 (1964); Matthews v. Guenther,
120 Neb. 742, 235 N.W. 98 (1931); Moorehead v. Hungerford, 110 Neb. 315, 193
N.W. 706 (1923); McCarthy v. Benedict, 89 Neb. 293, 131 N.W. 598 (1911); Plum-
mer v. Park, 62 Neb. 665, 87 N.W. 534 (1901); National Life Ins. Co. v. Butler, 61
Neb. 449, 85 N.W. 437 (1901); Hartsuff v. Hall, 58 Neb. 417, 78 N.W. 716 (1899);
Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Butler, 57 Neb. 198,77 N.W. 667 (1898); Low-
enstein v. Phelan, 17 Neb. 429, 22 N.W. 561 (1885); Beisel v. Artman, 10 Neb.
181, 4 N.W. 1011 (1880).
113. 206 Neb. at 480, 293 N.W.2d at 849.
114. 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973).
115. Id. at 532.
116. Id.
117. ABA Committee, supra note 24, at 907.
118. Citing E.K. Buck Retail Stores v. Harkert, 157 Neb. 867, 887, 62 N.W.2d 288, 301
(1954), the Occidental court said, "It is not the province of courts to emascu-
late the liberty of contract by enabling parties to escape their contractual ob-
ligations on the pretext of public policy unless the preservation of the public
welfare imperatively so demands." 206 Neb. at 480, 293 N.W.2d at 849.
119. 206 Neb. at 480-81, 293 N.W.2d at 849.
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contrary to public policy and void."120
Analyzing the Occidental opinion from a savings and loan per-
spective, one must admit a great victory. With this opinion, the
Nebraska Supreme Court has removed the due-on-sale from both
the restraint-on-alienation and the public policy limitations im-
posed on the clause's enforcement by several other jurisdictions.
Not only are these major stumbling blocks to enforcement re-
moved from judicial scrutiny, but so is the lender's motivation for
accelerating the clause. Occidental allows lenders to accelerate
upon breach for any reason, including purely economic considera-
tions. This overall license for automatic enforcement of the due-
on-sale may have been carried to extremes, unless the court relies
heavily on its equity powers to curtail possible abuse by lenders.' 21
C. Equitable Protections
Occidental preserves for the borrower one defense against au-
tomatic mortgage acceleration: traditional equitable relief. Just
how viable this defense will be is left to further judicial determina-
tion, due to the opinion's lack of specification. In announcing its
standard for borrower relief, the court merely stated: "If permit-
ting the lender to exercise the 'due-on-sale' clause in a particular
case would be inequitable, a court of equity is not helpless to fash-
ion appropriate relief."122
While this language suggests that a court may hear proof of in-
equitable or unconscionable conduct, the exact burden a borrower
must meet to obtain equitable relief is unknown. A look at other
Nebraska cases defining a court's equity powers in fashioning ap-
propriate relief is not helpful for resolving this question. However,
a recent opinion, Redding v. Gibbs,123 may be helpful. In Redding,
the court granted a mortgagor relief from the effect of an otherwise
enforceable acceleration clause when default was the result of un-
conscionable or inequitable conduct of the lender.124 Citing Domus
Realty Corp. v. 3440 Realty Co. ,125 the court stated: 'Tested by or-
dinary definition and by common understanding, 'oppressive'
means conduct that is unjustly burdensome, harsh or merciless
and 'unconscionable' means conduct that is monstrously harsh,
120. Id.
121. The Nebraska court noted that absolute enforcement of the due-on-sale was
subject to the rules enforcing any other acceleration clause, including the
protection of equitable defenses. Id. at 481-82, 293 N.W.2d at 849-50.
122. Id.
123. 203 Neb. 727, 280 N.W.2d 53 (1979).
124. Id. at 736, 280 N.W.2d at 58.
125. 179 Misc. 749, 40 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1943).
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that is shocking to the conscience."12 6
Noting its own test for relief, the Redding court said "the grav-
ity of the fault must be compared with the gravity of the hard-
ship." 27 In Redding, the mortgagee predicated acceleration upon
the inadvertent default of the mortgagor. Instead of inquiring into
the reasons for the default, the mortgagee waited for the grace pe-
riod to elapse and then brought the action to foreclose. The court
held that the mortgagee had a duty to inquire about the default
because it had knowledge that the default was inadvertent. Thus,
the court held the action subject to equitable relief.
Under Redding, a Nebraska court would presumably strike
down the due-on-sale clause when the lender's inequitable or un-
conscionable conduct occurred either in the formation of the con-
tract, or as in Redding, in the case of the lender taking advantage
of the borrower's inadvertant default. As an example of the first
situation, inequitable conduct would occur when a lender
promises to consent to a transfer upon the finding of a financially
suitable transferee, but instead demands an assumption fee upon
actual transfer.
In his dissent in Graf v. Hope Building Corp.,128 Chief Justice
Benjamin Cardozo set the standard for equitable relief in America.
He stated. "Equity follows the law, but not slavishly nor al-
ways.... If it did, there could never be occasion for the enforce-
ment of equitable doctrine." 129  Further expanding this
explanation, the Chief Justice stated: "Let the hardship be strong
enough, and equity will find a way, though many a formula of inac-
tion may seem to bar the path."3 0
Several other courts have fashioned similar tests, but, like Ne-
braska, none have affirmatively stated when equity will provide re-
lief.13l The Colorado Supreme Court,132 however, hypothesized an
occasion when equity would deny enforcement: equity would re-
126. I& at 757-58, 40 N.Y.S.2d at 73.
127. 203 Neb. at 739, 280 N.W.2d at 60.
128. 254 N.Y. 1, 171 N.E. 884 (1930).
129. Id. at 9, 171 N.E. at 887.
130. I& at 13, 171 N.E. at 888.
131. For example: "[T)his kind of clause is enforceable except in situations where
its operation 'would be inequitable under the circumstances' and thus would
justify the exercise of the court's equitable powers." Miller v. Pacific First
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 86 Wash. 2d 401, 406, 545 P.2d 546, 549 (1976).
"[D]efendant's refusal to consent to the sale of the mortgaged property to a
financially responsible purchaser does not constitute, in and of itself, an un-
conscionable or inequitable exercise of its option to accelerate the balance
due pursuant to the due-on-sale clause, which option is accordingly entitled
to judicial enforcement." Mutual Real Estate Inv. Co. v. Buffalo Sav. Bank, 90
Misc. 2d 675, 679-80, 395 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1977).
132. Malouff v. Midland Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240 (1973).
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lieve a borrower from a due-on-sale in which the lender attempted
to exact excessive interest. 33
IH. STATUTORY CONSIDERATIONS
Although the Occidental opinion did not consider the relevancy
of certain state and federal statutes which bear on the enforceabil-
ity of the due-on-sale clause,134 an argument for enforceability
could be based entirely upon statutes.135
Federal authority for the enforcement of the due-on-sale clause
lies in a Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FELBB) regulation.136
Pursuant to its congressional authority, the FHLBB promulgated
rules and regulations governing and authorizing the use of due-on-
sale clauses by federal savings and loan associations in all federal
mortgages.137 In its policy statement, the Board noted the neces-
sity of using the due-on-sale to balance interest portfolios in order
that a flow of new funds would continue to be available for future
home loans.138 The Board argued that the elimination of the
clause would cause a substantial reduction in the cash flow and net
income of federal associations, causing an increased interest rate
in all future home loans.139 Elimination of the due-on-sale, the
Board continued, would benefit only a limited number of home
sellers at the expense of the majority of home buyers and potential
home buyers.14 0
The FHLBB regulations temper extreme use of the clause by
allowing enforcement only when an actual transfer of an interest
133. Malouff limited its holding of the per se enforceability of the due-on-sale
clause in order to increase interest by warning that any attempt to exact an
excessive rate unrelated to the current market rate would require that the
court order relief for the borrower. Id. at 303, 509 P.2d at 1245.
134. Federal regulations, authorize the use and enforcement of due-on-sale
clauses in all federal savings and loan association mortgages. 12 C.F.R.
§ 546.6-11(b) (1980). NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-355 (Cum. Supp. 1978) gives Ne-
braska-chartered savings and loans all rights and privileges of federal savings
and loans. Read together, an argument could be made that the due-on-sale
clause is authorized in all Nebraska mortgages.
135. This argument, including state and federal statutes was fully briefed by the
parties in Occidental. See Brief of Appellee at 39-41; Brief of Amicus Curiae,
Nebraska League of Savings Associations, at 3-13; Reply Brief of Appellants
at 3-6.
136. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board is responsible for the regulation of fed-
eral savings and loan associations. It was created as an independent agency
of Congress pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1976 & Supp. I1 1979), as
amended by Act of Mar. 31,1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 304 (1980) (to be codified
in 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a)).
137. 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f) (g) (1980).
138. 41 Fed. Reg. 6285 (1976).
139. Id.
140. Id.
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in property takes place, thus eliminating acceleration upon further
encumbrance or lease.141 The regulations also limit acceleration to
clauses which do not provide for prepayment penalties.142 Occi-
dental argued that a Nebraska statute incorporated these federal
regulations into state law and thus mandated the use of due-on-
sale clauses in all mortgages. 43 The Nebraska statute gives all
savings and loans incorporated in Nebraska all rights, privileges,
benefits, and immunities which may be exercised by federal sav-
ings and loans.144 Occidental further argued that the federal regu-
lations specifically provide for the enforceability of due-on-sale
clauses and have thus pre-empted any contrary state rule with re-
gard to due-on-sale clauses affecting federal savings and loan
associations. 145
Finally, Occidental argued that the entire area of due-on-sale
clauses was pre-empted-federal savings and loans by the FHLBB
regulation and Nebraska-chartered savings and loans by Nebraska
statutes.14
In its amicus curiae brief, the Nebraska League of Savings As-
sociations explained the relation between the federal and state law
in this area:
State Associations must directly compete with federals. They must sur-
vive in a market dominated by financial and monetary decisions made at
the federal level. However desirable we may think it would be to make
decisions affecting state mortgage lending on a state level, the legislature
141. 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(g) (1980) provides as follows:
(g) Limitations on the exercise of due-on-sale clauses. With re-
spect to any loan made after July 31, 1976, on the security of a home
occupied or to be occupied by the borrower, a Federal association:(1) Shall not exercise a due-on-sale clause because of (i) creation of
a lien or other encumbrance subordinate to the association's security
instrument; (ii) creation of a purchase money security interest for
household appliances; (iii) transfer by devise, descent, or operation
of law on the death of a joint tenant; or (iv) granting of a leasehold
interest of three years or less not containing an option to purchase;
(2) shall not impose a prepayment charge or equivalent fee for accel-
eration of the loan by exercise of a due-on-sale clause.
142. Id.
143. Brief of Appellee at 38, Occidental Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership,
206 Neb. 469, 293 N.W.2d 843 (1980).
144. NEB. REv. STAT. § 8-355 (Cumn. Supp. 1978) states in part:
Notwithstanding any of the provisions of Chapter 8, article 3, or any
other Nebraska statute, any association incorporated under the laws
of the State of Nebraska and organized under the provisions of such
article shall have all rights, powers, privileges, benefits, and immuni-
ties which may be exercised as of July 22, 1978 by a Federal savings
and loan association doing business in Nebraska ....
145. Brief of Appellee at 39-40, Occidental Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership,
206 Neb. 469, 293 N.W.2d 843 (1980).
146. Id.
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has stated, in unambiguous terms, that it shall not be.14 7
Thus, the Nebraska League's argument is that the legislature's
purpose in enacting the savings and loan statute was to equalize
state and federal savings and loan associations so that state as-
sociations would not be disadvantaged by federal law.148
The federal pre-emption issue was tested in Glendale Federal
Savings and Loan Association v. Fox. 49 The court held that fed-
eral regulations specifically authorized the enforcement of due-on-
sale clauses in federal savings and loan associations and that any
contrary state law was pre-empted.150 The Glendale court stated:
"Federal associations shall not be bound by or subject to any con-
flicting State law which imposes different... due-on-sale require-
ments. ... 151 Glendale implicitly overruled Wellenkamp in so
much as it affected use of the due-on-sale by federal savings and
loan associations.152
IV. CONCLUSION
Decisions such as Wellenkamp, 5 3 which have invalidated the
due-on-sale clause on the basis of presumed social need and the
presumed effect of the due-on-sale on the marketplace, have given
property owners a short-lived victory. A legislative counter-offen-
sive has already begun, giving mortgagees access to other inflation-
fighting mortgage devices. 5 4 The use of variable-interest mort-
gages is at least as, if not more, oppressive to the mortgagor as the
due-on-sale clause.155
The varying circumstances of the marketplace often dictate use
of undesirable methods of control, but this does not mean that
they should be stricken as against public policy. Occidental took a
147. Brief of Amicus Curiae, Nebraska League of Savings Association, at 13.
148. Id.
149. 459 F. Supp. 903 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
150. Id. at 907.
151. Id. at 912 (citing 41 Fed. Reg. 18287 (1976)).
152. Id.
153. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 582 P.2d 970 (1978).
154. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1916.5 (Deering 1971 & Supp. 1980).
155. One critic of the Wellenkamp decision noted the minimal differences be-
tween a due-on-sale and the variable-interest mortgage by concluding.
The economic effect of the variable-interest rate mortgage and the
exercise of the due-on clause to achieve an interest rate increase can-
not be vastly different. While the court [Wellenkamp] approves of
use of the variable rate mortgage, it declares illegitimate the use of
the due-on clause to achieve the same purpose. Why it is unjust to
burden the property owner with the effect of changing economic con-
ditions under a due-on clause, but "attractive and viable" to do so
under a variable rate mortgage, is unexplained.
ABA Committee, supra note 24, at 930 (footnotes omitted).
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reasonable approach to a complex problem in Nebraska. By au-
thorizing the due-on-sale in Nebraska, the court has allowed lend-
ers and, in the long run, borrowers to be protected from the
fluctuations of the market interest rates. Until the legislature cor-
rects the problem statutorily, the due-on-sale appears to be the
best way to balance the equities between lender and borrower56
Lisa Marie Broman '82
156. It is interesting to note that the 1980 Unicameral virtually eliminated the
usury ceilings on home mortgage loans. NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-101.04 (Cum.
Supp. 1980) provided a total exemption from interest rate ceilings on loans
from any single institution over $25,000. If due-on-sale clauses can be used to
allow savings and loan associations to balance interest portfolios, maybe
lenders will be more likely to resist the temptation of charging excessive in-
terest rates on new loans.
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